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Sexual Harassment and the Reasonable Woman
Standard: Is It a Viable Solution?
We adopt the perspective of a reasonable woman primarily because we
believe that a sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased
and tends to systematically ignore the experiences of women. . . . [A] gen-
der conscious examination of sexual harassment enables women to partici-
pate in the workplace on equal footing with men.1
During the past several decades, millions of women have strug-
gled to gain social acceptance and equality in the workplace. This
struggle has centered upon and evolved around many important
issues including, but not limited to, equal employment opportu-
nity, opportunity for advancement, and maternity leave. Although
these issues still remain prominent in the women's struggle for
equality in the workplace today, resolving the problem of sexual
harassment in the workplace has recently gained significant atten-
tion in this movement.2
The recent decisions of some courts to adopt explicit or implicit
reasonable woman standards in determining sexual harassment
claims may prove to be a promising development in the women's
quest for social acceptance and equality in the workplace. This
comment will first discuss the development of the two types of sex-
ual harassment claims-quid pro quo sexual harassment and hos-
tile environment sexual harassment. As part of this discussion, this
comment will examine the courts' ineffectiveness in adjudicating
the hostile environment sexual harassment claim. Next, the com-
ment will focus upon the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision
to adopt an explicit reasonable woman standard in adjudicating
the hostile environment sexual harassment claim. As part of this
discussion, the comment will also identify other courts which have
1. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Ellison v Brady, 924
F2d 872, 879 (9th Cir 1991). See notes 48-55 and the accompanying text for a discussion of
Ellison.
2. Fifty-three percent of working women report experiencing 'conduct which they
would describe as sexual harassment. Barbara A. Gutek, Sex and the Workplace, 47-48
(Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1985) (emphasis added). This finding merely means that an individual
woman would find the conduct to be harassment; not that the conduct meets the legal stan-
dard for harassment. Gutek, Sex and the Workplace at 47-48.
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adopted implicit reasonable woman standards in adjudicating hos-
tile environment sexual harassment claims. Finally, the viability of
using a reasonable woman standard and its influence in enabling
women to participate in the workplace on equal footing will be
addressed.
I. WHAT IS SEXUAL HARASSMENT?
Although sexual harassment encompasses many types of con-
duct, a sexual harassment claim will generally fall into one of two
broad categories. The first is quid pro quo sexual harassment. Quid
pro quo sexual harassment is the traditional and most obvious
form of sexual harassment in that it generally involves "the ex-
change of employment benefits by a supervisor or employer for
sexual favors from a subordinate employee."' Generally, the perpe-
trators of this form of sexual harassment are employers or supervi-
sors since they have the power to withhold economic benefits or
prevent advancement. As such, the effect of quid pro quo sexual
harassment is generally tangible economic loss (or gain).4
The second category of sexual harassment is hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment. Hostile environment sexual harassment is
the more recently recognized form of sexual harassment. Further-
more, because this type of sexual harassment is the less perceptible
and/or detectible form of sexual harassment, it tends to be the
more pervasive form of sexual harassment in today's workplace.
Unlike quid pro quo sexual harassment, in which a tangible deal is
struck for employment benefits, in hostile environment sexual har-
assment the day-to-day working environment is infested with ver-
bal or physical abuses which challenge the intangible psychological
well-being of the workers.6 This type of harassment may range
from sexual touching or demands, to sexual comments and epi-
thets, to the mere circulation of pornography.' To fully understand
3. Alba Conte, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Law and Practice § 2.2 at 15
(John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1990).
4. Tangible economic loss may include termination, transfer, delay or denial of em-
ployment benefits, or adverse work performance evaluations. Conte, Sexual Harassment in
the Workplace: Law and Practice § 2.2 at 16. This loss may occur in various ways: (1)
benefits may be withheld from an employee until she submits to sexual demands; (2) an
employer or supervisor may retaliate against an employee who has refused sexual advances
by firing her or altering or withholding tangible job benefits; and (3) an employee may sub-
mit to an advance and still not receive the job benefit. Id.
5. Id at 15-17 (cited in note 3).
6. Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 Vand L Rev 1183, 1198 (1989).
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the courts' treatment of the two types of sexual harassment a brief
examination of the history and development of the sexual harass-
ment claim is warranted.
II. THE HISTORY OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the
Equal Opportunity Employment Act of 1972, ("Title VII"), made
it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex.7 However, although the provisions of Title
VII expressly prohibited various discriminatory conduct, the spe-
cific language of Title VII did not address the issue of whether
sexual harassment constituted sexual discrimination within the ti-
tle. As such, federal courts initially held that there was no cause of
action under Title VII for sexual harassment."
Williams v Saxbe was the first court to determine that sexual
harassment was discriminatory conduct within the meaning of Ti-
tle VII.9 Significantly, this decision did not occur until more than
7. 42 USC § 2000e-2(a) as amended provides:
§ 2000E-2. UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
(A) EMPLOYER PRACTICES. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge an individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 USC § 2000e-2 (emphasis added).
8. The first four federal courts to adjudicate a sexual harassment claim held that it
did not violate Title VII. See Barnes v Train, 13 FEP Cases 123 (D DC 1974); Corne v
Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F Supp 161 (D Ariz 1975), vacated on procedural grounds, 562
F2d 55 (9th Cir 1977); Tompkins v Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 422 F Supp 553 (D
NJ 1976), rev'd, 568 F2d 1044 (3d Cir 1977); and Miller v Bank of America, 418 F Supp 233
(ND Cal 1976), rev'd, 600 F2d 211 (9th Cir 1979).
9. 413 F Supp 654 (D DC 1976), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 587 F2d 1240 (DC Cir
1978). In Williams, the plaintiff, a female, brought an action to recover damages for the
defendant's alleged violations of the provisions of Title VII. Williams, 413 F Supp at 655.
The plaintiff alleged that she had been denied equal employment opportunities because of
her sex. Id. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that she had had a good working relationship
with her supervisor until she refused a sexual advance. Id. Thereafter, her supervisor contin-
ually harassed and humiliated her. Id.
The district court framed the issue as "whether the retaliatory actions of a male supervi-
sor, taken because a female employee declined sexual advances, constitute[d] sex discrimi-
nation within the parameters of Title VII .. " Id. The court concluded that since the
conduct of the supervisor created an artificial barrier to employment, the plaintiff made out
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four years after the 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Moreover, although Williams may have marked a turning
point for sexual harassment law, many courts continued interpret-
ing Title VII in their customary manner since Williams was not
binding precedent.10
The diversity in judicial construction of Title VII prompted the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")1 in 1980
to develop guidelines for analyzing sexual harassment claims.
12
The EEOC guidelines were important in two respects. First, the
guidelines affirmed the position that sexual harassment in employ-
ment violated Title VII. s Secondly, the guidelines not only defined
sexual harassment in traditional terms, as any conduct which de-
prived an individual of tangible economic benefits for its failure to
succumb to sexual advances, it also indicated, for the first time,
that sexual harassment included any conduct of a sexual nature
that created a hostile or offensive working condition."' Accordingly,
a cause of action under Title VII. Id at 657-58. The court reasoned, in rejecting the defend-
ant's narrow view of the prohibition of the statute, that "Congress intended to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women." Id at 658 quoting Sprogis v
United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir 1971).
10. By 1977, all federal courts faced with a sexual harassment claim agreed that,
under certain circumstances, sexual harassment violated Title VII. Ralph H. Baxter, Jr. and
Lynn C. Hermle, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace at 8 (Executive Enterprises Publi-
cation Co., Inc., 3d ed 1989). The courts differed, however, on the circumstances. For exam-
ple, to find that sexual harassment was discriminating treatment within the meaning of Ti-
tle VII, most courts required that the plaintiff show the loss of a tangible employment
benefit. See, for example, Fisher v Flynn, 598 F2d 663, 665 (1st Cir 1979); Heelan v Johns-
Manville Corp., 451 F Supp 1382, 1388 (D Colo 1978); and Munford v James T. Barnes &
Co., 441 F Supp 459, 465-66 (ED Mich 1977). Other courts required that the plaintiff show
that the alleged sexual conduct was an employer-approved practice. See, for example,
Garber v Saxon Business Prods., 552 F2d 1032 (4th Cir 1977).
11. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is an agency created by the
1964 Civil Rights Act for the purpose of promoting action programs that would effectuate
equal employment opportunities. 42 USC § 2000e-4, §§ 12111, 12117.
12. These EEOC guidelines were originally enacted on November 10, 1980, at 45 Fed
Reg 74677 (1980).
13. 29 CFR § 1604.11 (1991).
14. 29 CFR § 1604.11. 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) expressly provides:
§ 1604.11. SEXUAL HARASSMENT.
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Section 703 of Title VII. Unwel-
come sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical con-
duct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such
conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used
as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct
has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work per-
formance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
29 CFR § 1604.11.
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the guidelines encouraged judicial recognition of the hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment claim.
Although the EEOC guidelines articulated the concept of "hos-
tile environment" sexual harassment, because the commission was
only an administrative agency, whose promulgations did not have
the force of law, some courts were initially unwilling to recognize a
hostile environment claim. 16 Not until six years after the EEOC
guidelines were promulgated did the United States Supreme Court
finally end the debate over whether a hostile environment sexual
harassment claim was actionable under Title VII.
The Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Meritor Sav-
ings Bank v Vinson on June 19, 1986.16 In Meritor, the female-
plaintiff, a bank-teller who had advanced to branch manager,
brought a sexual harassment claim under Title VII. The plaintiff
testified that she had had a sexual relationship with the vice presi-
dent of the defendant-bank because she feared losing her job.
17
Thereafter, the plaintiff alleged that the vice president began mak-
ing repeated demands for sexual favors at the office, both during
and after business hours, fondled her in front of other employees,
followed her into the women's restroom when she entered alone,
and exposed himself to her. 8 The vice president denied the fe-
male-plaintiff's allegations of sexual activity.19 Without resolving
the conflicting testimony, the district court found that absent an
15. Although most courts acknowledged the viability of a hostile environment sexual
harassment cause of action, some courts rejected the hostile environment theory outright or
through omission. Conte, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Law and Practice § 2.13 at
42-43 (cited in note 3). For example, some courts merely omitted instructing or addressing
elements of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim. See Meyers v ITT Diversified
Credit Corp., 527 F Supp 1064 (ED Mo 1981) (The court's conclusions of law only addressed
elements of quid pro quo harassment even though, prior to termination, the plaintiff had
been moved to a back room, placed on a different time schedule to facilitate her presence in
the office after the other employees had left the building and, thereafter, subjected to nu-
merous uninvited instances where her superior placed his hands on her shoulders and
thighs).
16. 477 US 57 (1986). The Meritor decision is usually described as a "landmark" case
because it marked the first time that the Supreme Court had ruled on the viability of a legal
cause of action for sexual harassment under Title VII. However, as discussed previously in
this comment, the lower federal courts had, since Williams v Saxbe in 1976, been finding
that quid pro quo sexual harassment was punishable under Title ViI. Furthermore, hostile
environment sexual harassment claims were first judicially recognized as a violation under
Title VII in Bundy v Jackson, 641 F2d 934 (DC Cir 1981).
17. Meritor, 477 US at 60. The female-plaintiff had initially refused the vice presi-
dent's advances but eventually acquiesced. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id at 61.
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economic effect, a sexual harassment claim would not lie.2
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the defendant-
bank argued that Title VII, in prohibiting discrimination with re-
spect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges" of em-
ployment, was only concerned with "tangible loss" of "an economic
character," and not "purely psychological aspects of the workplace
environment.'"' The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment and held that the claim of "hostile environment" sexual har-
assment was a form of sexual discrimination that was actionable
under Title VII.22 The Court based its holding upon two rationales.
First, the Court reasoned that the language of Title VII was not
limited to "economic" or "tangible" discrimination; rather, Con-
gress' intent with the Act was "to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women" in employment.2 3 Second,
the Court opined that the EEOC guidelines, which drew upon a
substantial body of judicial decisions, afforded employees the right
to work in an environment free of intimidation, ridicule, and
insult.
24
Although the Meritor decision ended all debate whether hostile
environment sexual harassment was proscribed by Title VII, the
decision failed to address the disagreement between the circuit
courts in defining hostile environment sexual harassment claims-
specifically, what precise conduct would create a sexually hostile
environment?
The EEOC guidelines offered little guidance in this area. The
guidelines stated only that in determining whether alleged conduct
constituted sexual harassment, the legality of any conduct should
be made on a case by case basis. 25 The guidelines further stated
20. Id.
21. Id at 64 citing Brief for Petitioner 30-31, 34.
22. Meritor, 477 US at 65.
23. Id at 64 quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v Manhart, 435 US 702,
707 (1978).
24. Meritor, 477 US at 65. The Court, although noting that the EEOC guidelines
were not binding on the courts by reason of their authority, gave credibility to the guide-
lines by stating that "courts and litigants may resort (to them] for guidance." Id. As a re-
sult, today the EEOC guidelines are given considerable weight as authority. The relevant
sections of the EEOC guidelines are cited in note 14.
25. 29 CFR § 1604.11(b)..29 CFR §1604.11(b) expressly provides:
(b) In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the
Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circum-
stances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the al-
leged incidents occurred. The determination of the legality of a particular action will
be made from the facts, on a case by case basis.
29 CFR § 1604.11(b).
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that the determination was to be made by looking at the "totality
of the circumstances" of the nature and context in which the al-
leged conduct occurred.2 6
.Judicially, the courts after Meritor agreed that hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment existed when an employee was subjected
to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors or other
conduct of a sexual nature that was sufficiently severe, pervasive,
or unreasonable so as to alter the conditions of the victims' em-
ployment and create an abusive working environment.2 7 No stan-
dards or definitions emerged in the courts, however, to explain or
define the contours of "severe," "pervasive," or "unreasonable"
conduct. The result was inconsistency in the decisions of the
courts. For example, in some cases the courts found lewd com-
ments, inquiries, and jokes, the use of sexual epithets, and/or the
prominent display of pornographic materials to constitute sexual
harassment.28 By contrast, other courts confronted with the same
conduct ruled that such actions did not constitute sexual harass-
ment.2 9 More specifically, some courts found that sexual touching
was actionable,"0 while other courts did not.31 If any consistency
For more text on 29 CFR § 1604.11, see note 14 and accompanying text.
26. Id.
27. Jordan v Clark, 847 F2d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir 1988). See also Jones v Flagship
Int'l., 793 F2d 714 (5th Cir 1986); Scott v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F2d 210 (7th Cir 1986).
Today, many circuit courts have separated the requisite elements of a hostile environment
sexual harassment claim into precise components. The Third Circuit, for example, requires
that "five constituents must converge to bring a successful claim for a sexually hostile work
environment under Title VII: (1) the employees suffered intentional discrimination because
of their sex; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination detri-
mentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasona-
ble person of the same sex in that position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior
liability." Andrews v City of Philadelphia, 895 F2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir 1990).
28. See, for example, Coley v Conrail, 561 F Supp 645 (ED Mich 1982) (The court
found the supervisor's constant sexually explicit and demeaning remarks pertaining the
plaintiff's menstrual cycle and the size of her breasts to be sufficiently severe and persistent
to constitute sexual harassment). See also Zabkowicz v West Bend Co., 589 F Supp 780 (ED
Wisc 1984) (Male co-workers inquiries about whether the plaintiff was wearing a bra, calling
her "slut" and "cunt", and posting, over a three year period, approximately 75 sexually
provocative drawings referring to the plaintiff in disparaging terms was more than merely
unreasonable).
29. See Rabidue v Osceola Refining Co., 805 F2d 611 (6th Cir 1986) (where the work-
place contained posters of naked and partially dressed women and male co-workers and
supervisors customarily called the plaintiff "whore," "cunt" and other vulgarisms the con-
duct did not qualify as severe conduct).
30. See, for example, Martin v Norbar, Inc., 537 F Supp 1260 (SD Ohio 1982) (Em-
ployer's motion for summary judgment was denied where co-workers made lewd comments,
sexual advances and touched the plaintiffs legs and thighs on several occasions).
31. See Highlander v KFC Natl. Management Co., 805 F2d 644 (6th Cir 1986) (The
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did exist in the courts' decisions, it rested on the fact that few
plaintiff's prevailed under a hostile environment sexual harassment
theory.
The courts' failure to effectively adjudicate hostile environment
type claims may have resulted from a variety of reasons. First, the
courts' ineffectiveness may be self-imposed. As mentioned previ-
ously, the courts have done little if anything to explain, expound,
develop or define the evolving principles of this relatively new area
in the law. For instance, courts still have not sufficiently ex-
pounded on the meaning of "severe," "pervasive," or "unreasona-
ble" conduct. Second, the courts' ineffectiveness may result from
their inability or unwillingness to understand, on a more funda-
mental level, the underlying aspects and problems of the sexual
harassment claim itself.
The failure of some courts to adequately understand and address
the hostile environment claim can best be exemplified by High-
lander v KFC Natl. Management Co..2 In Highlander, the plain-
tiff, a female, alleged that a male co-worker approached her and
another female employee and made comments about their "chic"
uniforms.3 3 The plaintiff claimed that the male co-worker then be-
gan touching the females' legs and buttocks to see if they were
wearing "Underalls" and also touched the plaintiff's nametag
which was displayed over her breast.-4 The plaintiff informed the
co-manager of the incident but did not file a report because she
"did not want to make a big stink about it."3 6 The plaintiff also
alleged that a week or so later a manager, who had conducted an
investigation into the prior incident, told her that if she wanted to
become a co-manager "there was a motel across the street.""e Fi-
nally, the plaintiff alleged that she was constantly subjected to
crude conversation from co-workers.3 7 The district court held for
the defendant.
court held that one instance of fondling the plaintiff's breasts and buttocks and one verbal
proposition by two different managers were not sufficient to establish a hostile environ-
ment). See also Scott v Sears Roebuck & Co., 798 F2d 210 (7th Cir 1986), and Walter v
KFGO Radio, 518 F Supp 1309 (D ND 1981).
32. 805 F2d 644 (6th Cir 1986).
33. Highlander, 805 F2d at 646.
34. Id.
35. Id. After an investigation was conducted by another manager, the plaintiff also
stated in an interview with this manager, that she did not desire to make an issue out of the
whole matter because she did not "think it was that big a deal." Id.
36. Id.
37. Id at 650.
Vol. 31:841848
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The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
judgment for the defendant and held, inter alia, that the plaintiff
had failed to carry her burden of proof that she had been exposed
to hostile environment sexual harassment."' In support of this
holding, the court pointed to the plaintiff's attitude that she
"didn't think it [the incident] was that big of a deal" and her fail-
ure to file immediate reports because she did not want to raise "a
big stink about it." 39
The result in Highlander emanates, as one writer suggests, from
the failure of the judiciary to consider and attempt to understand
the female-plaintiff's perspective of sexual harassment.4" This au-
thor agrees and, therefore, contends that the courts should adopt a
method of adjudicating hostile environment sexual harassment
claims that would take into account the females' perspective.,1
III. THE NEED FOR CHANGE?
Professor Kathryn Abrams, in her insightful 1989 Vanderbilt
Law Review article entitled Gender Discrimination and the
Transformation of Workplace Norms,"'2 urged that the courts
adopt an adjudicative approach to sexual harassment claims that
would consider the female-plaintiff's perspective. Professor
38. Id.
39. Id at 650.
40. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Work-
place Norms, 42 Vand L Rev 1183 (1989). For a discussion of the Abrams' article see notes
42-47 and accompanying text.
41. This author believes that the use of a reasonable woman standard would only
serve its purpose in the adjudication of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim (and
not a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim). The "critical link" of the hostile environment
claim, as Catherine MacKinnon aptly stated, "is the relationship of sexuality that society
attached to gender." Catherine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A
Case of Sex Discrimination, 174 (Yale University Press, 1979). The underlying theory posits
that there is a sexual power asymmetry between men and women. Id. This theory also sug-
gests that "women's sexuality define women as women" but men's sexuality do not define
men as men. Id. Therefore, whether the crucial element of proving a hostile environment
harassment claim is met- that is, whether conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive so as
to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment- inherently depends on whether the element is considered from the perspective of
the reasonable woman or reasonable man.
Conversely, under quid pro quo harassment, the essential element to be proved-a tangi-
ble job loss or gain resulting from refusal or submission to unwelcome sexual ad-
vances-does not depend on the perspective in which it is viewed. Furthermore, a successful
quid pro quo claim does not depend on whether conduct is deemed "pervasive" or "severe."
Conversely, a single event may be sufficient to prove quid pro quo sexual harassment claim.
42. Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 Vand L Rev 1183 (1989).
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Abrams enunciated the importance of rethinking sexual harass-
ment from the woman's point of view for the simple reason that
"men regard conduct [in the workplace], ranging from sexual de-
mands to sexual innuendos, differently than women do."'43 This
difference, Professor Abrams explained, results from at least two
factors. First, since women are relative newcomers to many types
of work and, therefore, often occupy the entry-level positions of an
occupation, many women suffer from feelings of low self-esteem or
inferiority.'4 Consequently, sexual advances or innuendos may be
construed by women as judgments about their ability to succeed.45
Secondly, because women, in general, have greater physical vulner-
ability and have been raised in a society where rape and sexual
assaults have reached unprecedented levels, many women may
have good cause to be wary of sexual encounters.4'6 Abrams con-
tended, therefore, that these two factors must be understood and
accounted for before the courts can effectively adjudicate sexual
harassment claims. Consequently, she proposed a "revised ap-
proach" that would emphasize the victim's perspective- that of a
reasonable woman. 7
IV. THE REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD
Citing the Abrams article, the reasonable woman standard was
first explicitly espoused and adopted by the Ninth Circuit court of
Appeals in Ellison v Brady.'8 In Ellison, the plaintiff, a female,
43. Abrams, 42 Vand L Rev at 1202 (cited in note 42).
44. Id at 1204. Professor Abrams contends also that perhaps it is simply not the
womens' comparatively recent entry into the professions which make many women feel like
newcomers, but rather their lack of control over important decisions and workplace norms.
Id at 1204 n 89.
45. Id at 1205.
46. Id at 1205. A woman's wariness of sexual encounters, Professor Abrams asserts,
might also correspond to the rapid rise of the pornography industry, which has created con-
tinuous images of sexual coercion and violence. Id.
47. Id at 1191-93 (cited in note 42).
48. 924 F2d 872 (9th Cir 1991). The reasonable woman standard was first espoused in
the Rabidue dissent by Judge Keith. Rabidue v Osceola Refining Co., 805 F2d 611, 623-28
(6th Cir 1986). In his dissent, Judge Keith criticized the majority's finding that the lewd
comments and posters of nude and semi-clad women did not create a hostile working envi-
ronment since "the overall circumstances of the plaintiff's workplace evince[d] an anti-fe-
male environment". Rabidue, 805 F2d at 623. In criticizing the majority's conclusion, he
disagreed with the court's holding that, in considering hostile environment claims, the
courts should adopt the perspective of the reasonable person's reaction to a similar environ-
ment. The judge opined, "the reasonable person perspective fails to account for the wide
divergence between most women's views of appropriate sexual conduct and those of men."
Id at 626. Moreover, the judge concluded, unless a reasonable woman standard is adopted,
.Vol. 31:841
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brought a sexual harassment action under Title VII against a male
co-worker.49 For months, the male co-worker had written the plain-
tiff numerous bizarre love letters, pestered her with unnecessary
questions, and hung around her desk requesting lunch dates.50 The
district court granted the government's motion for summary judg-
ment on the ground that Ellison had failed to state a prima facia
case of hostile environment sexual harassment. 1
On appeal, the appellate court formulated the issue as "what
test should be applied to determine whether conduct is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the [working] condition. . .?," The
court ultimately reversed the district court and held that "a female
plaintiff states a prima facia case of hostile environment sexual
harassment when she alleges conduct which a reasonable woman
would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condi-
tions of employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment."53 In so holding, the court stated that it adopted the reason-
able woman standard because it believed that "[A] sex-blind
reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to
systematically ignore the experiences of women. '54 Such a gender-
conscious standard, the court concluded, would not establish a
higher level of protection for women than men, but rather, would
enable women "to participate in the workplace on an equal footing
with men."
'55
Presently, no other circuit court has adopted an explicit reasona-
ble woman standard as articulated by the Ninth Circuit; that be-
ing, the explicit standard which constructively considers the per-
"the defendants as well as the courts [will be] permitted to sustain ingrained notions of
reasonable behavior fashioned by the offenders, in this case, men." Id.
49. Ellison, 924 F2d at 873.
50. Id at 873-74. One love letter, dated October 22, 1986, read:
I cried over you last night and I'm totally drained today. I have never been in such
constant term oil (sic). Thank you for talking with me. I could not stand to feel your
hatred for another day. Id at 874.
Another letter read:
I know that you are worth knowing with or without sex. . . . Leaving aside the
hassles and disasters of recent weeks. I have enjoyed you from 0 so far away. Admir-
ing your style and elan. . . . Don't you think it odd that two people who have never
even talked together, alone, are striking off such intense sparks . . . I will [write]
another letter in the near future.
Id.
51. Id at 875.
52. Id at 873.
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spective of the female-victim in the adjudication of hostile
environment sexual harassment claims. Although most courts con-
tinue applying a reasonable person standard by comparing the re-
action of the plaintiff to the perspective of the hypothetical reason-
able person, 6  some courts have replaced the hypothetical
"reasonable person" with the hypothetical "reasonable person of
the characterized individual. ' 57 These courts, however, separate or
delineate the reasonable person and the reasonable person of the
characterized individual only linguistically and cursorily without
explaining the semantic difference, if any, between the standards
or the perspectives of the two. 8 This approach demonstrates the
56. Currently, the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and probably the
Sixth Circuit apply a traditional reasonable person standard to adjudicate hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment claims:
First Circuit: See Morgan v Massachusetts General Hospital, 901 F2d 186 (1st Cir 1990)
(The district court did not err in determining that the conduct was not of the type that
would interfere with a reasonable person's work performance, nor would it seriously affect a
reasonable person's psychological well-being to the extent required by Title VII).
Second Circuit: See Trotta v Mobile Oil Corporation, 788 F Supp 1336 (SD NY 1992) (In
determining whether the conduct in question violates Title VII, the conduct must be viewed
from the standard of a reasonable person).
Fourth Circuit: See Paroline v Unisys Corp., 879 F2d 100 (4th Cir 1989), superseded and
vacated in part on rehearing in Paroline v Unisys Corp., 900 F2d 27 (4th Cir 1990) (Plaintiff
raised a genuine issue as to whether unwelcome touching and sexual innuendo would signifi-
cantly affect the psychological well-being or the job performance of a reasonable person in
like circumstances).
Sixth Circuit: For a discussion of the standard employed by the Sixth Circuit to adjudi-
cate hostile environment sexual harassment claims, see the discussion of Rabidue (cited in
note 29) and Highlander (cited in note 32) in notes 57-58.
Seventh Circuit: See Daniels v Essex Group, Inc., 937 F2d 1264 (7th Cir 1991) (When
evaluating a Title VII sexual or racial harassment claim, the court must consider, inter alia,
the likely effect of a defendant's conduct upon a reasonable person's ability to perform his
or her work and upon his or her well-being).
Eighth Circuit: See Burns v McGregor Electronic Industries, Inc., 955 F2d 559 (8th Cir
1992) (On remand, the district court must consider whether a reasonable person would con-
sider the conduct of the defendants to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condi-
tions of employment and create an abusive work environment).
57. When the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Rabidue on November 13, 1986,
the court stated that when judging the circumstances which give rise to a hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment claim, the court "must adopt the perspective of a reasonable per-
son's reaction to a similar environment." Rabidue, 805 F2d at 620 (cited in note 29). Only
five days later, however, that same court, in deciding Highlander, focused not only on the
"perspective of a reasonable person's reaction to a similar environment" but also looked to
determine if, under this perspective, "the defendant's conduct . . . would have seriously
affected the psychological well-being of that characterized individual." Highlander, 805
F2d at 650 (emphasis added) (cited in note 32).
58. Whether the court in Highlander intended to modify the Rabidue standard is
arguable. Looking at the language employed by the Sixth Circuit in both decisions, an argu-
ment could be made, at least from a semantics standpoint, that the court in Highlander by
further defining the standard it had set in Rabidue, had moved toward an implicit'reasona-
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courts' lack of understanding of the sexual harassment claim. The
reasonable person standard assumes males and females alike share
the same view of sexual harassment. Replacing the reasonable per-
son with the reasonable person of that characterized individual
without differentiating the views and setting apart the standards
shows less of an effort to see beyond the male-biased perspective of
the reasonable person than an attempt to merge or approximate
the two views and standards.
Nevertheless, within the past few years, there have been a few
circuit courts which have adopted implicit reasonable woman stan-
dards to adjudicate hostile environment sexual harassment
claims.59 Under these approaches, the courts analyze the plaintiff's
perspective subjectively and objectively. Generally, under the ob-
jective element, the perspective of a reasonable person of the same
sex is scrutinized. Therefore, when the plaintiff is female (which is
generally the case), the perspective of the reasonable woman is ex-
amined. For example, the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida used such a standard in Robinson v
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.
6 0
In Robinson, the plaintiff, a female, commenced an action pursu-
ant to Title VII asserting that the defendants created and en-
couraged a sexually hostile, intimidating work environment. 1 In
this non-jury action, the plaintiff presented an abundant amount
of photographs and documentary evidence which evidenced: (1)
ble woman standard. That is to say where the plaintiff was a female, the perspective, of a
reasonable person of that characterized individual would be a reasonable woman.
Unfortunately, however, the Highlander court did not indicate that it was modifying,
changing, or replacing the reasonable person standard it had defined in Rabidue. Nor did it
indicate that there was any difference in the standards or perspectives as stated. Further-
more, no Sixth Circuit decision since Highlander has mentioned the linguistical differences
of Rabidue and Highlander. Further still, almost all Sixth Circuit decisions since High-
lander cite Rabidue as precedent. The logical conclusions, therefore, are: One, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals probably did not intend to modify or change the reasonable person
standard established in Rabidue, and; two, the Sixth Circuit, today, continues to adhere to a
traditional reasonable person standard to adjudicate hostile environment sexual harassment
claims.
59. Currently, the Third Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit apply an implicit reasona-
ble woman standard to adjudicate hostile environment sexual harassment claims:
Third Circuit: See Andrews v City of Philadelphia, 895 F2d 1469 (3d Cir 1990) (On re-
mand, the trial judge should look at all of the incidents to see if they produce a work envi-
ronment hostile and offensive to women of reasonable sensibilities).
Eleventh Circuit: See Robinson (cited in note 60). For a discussion of Robinson see notes
60-69 and accompanying text.
60. 760 F Supp 1486 (MD Fla 1991).
61. Robinson, 760 F Supp at 1490.
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the confirmation of the presence of pictures in the workplace of
undressed women, and (2) the verification of remarks made by
male co-workers and supervisors which demeaned women.62 The
plaintiff also presented two female expert witnesses.
One expert, whose specialty was on common patterns and re-
sponses to sexual harassment, testified that men and women per-
ceive the existence of sexual harassment differently.6 3  In the
court's opinion, this expert's testimony provided a sound explana-
tion for the contradictory testimony of the defendant's male expert
witnesses pertaining to the alleged harassing behavior as well as
the working conditions at Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. (JSI).4 Ac-
cordingly, based on this evidence, the court found that the defend-
ants had violated Title VII by maintaining a sexually hostile work-
ing environment.6 5
In so holding, the court opined, inter alia, that the plaintiff was
required to prove the harassment complained of affected the con-
ditions of her employment.6 This requirement, the court stated,
must be tested both subjectively and objectively.6 7 Regarding the
former, the court declared that the question was whether the
plaintiff had shown that she had been an affected individual. Re-
garding the latter (the objective standard), the test was whether a
person of the plaintiff's sex - a reasonable woman - would perceive
62. Id at 1490-91. Robinson testified that innumerable pictures of nude and partially
nude women appeared throughout the JSI workplace in the form of magazines, plaques,
photographs and calendars. Id at 1493. She also testified about comments of a sexual nature
which she recalled hearing from co-workers. Id. Remarks recalled by Robinson included:
"I'd like to have some of that;" "come sit on my lap;" and "the more you lick it, the harder
it gets." Id at 1498.
63. Id at 1507. The other expert, who specialized in sexual stereotyping, testified that
studies showed that stimuli of nude photographs and sexually explicit language in the work-
place encouraged a significant number of the male population in the workforce to view
women as sex objects. Id at 1503. The study showed, for instance, that when profanity was
tolerated in the workplace, women were three times more likely to be treated as sex objects
than in a workplace where profanity was not tolerated. Id at 1504. Furthermore, when sex-
ual joking was prevalent in the work environment, treating women as sex objects were three
to seven times more likely to occur. Id at 1505.
64. Id at 1507. One of the defendant's male expert witnesses had testified that the
visual materials in the JSI workplace, in his opinion, did not create a serious or probable
harm to the average woman. Id at 1508. He also testified that these materials do not pro-
mote sexual aggression by men or induce calloused attitudes toward women. Id.
Another of the defendant's male expert witnesses testified that, in his opinion, the aver-
age woman would not be substantially negatively affected by the materials. Id at 1509.
65. Id at 1491.
66. Id at 1522.
67. Id at 1524.
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the plaintiffs workplace to be an abusive working environment. 8
Thereafter, the court concluded that not only did the evidence
show that Robinson became greatly upset when confronted with
the episodes of harassment, but also that a reasonable woman
would have found the working environment at JSI to have been
abusive."
Notwithstanding the explicit reasonable woman standard, the
implicit reasonable woman standards can also be useful in effec-
tively adjudicating hostile environment sexual harassment claims,
since they not only consider the perspective of the reasonable wo-
man, but also elicit testimony that men regard sexual conduct in
the workplace differently than women do.
V. VIABILITY OF THE REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD
Undoubtedly there are several potential problems with adopting
the explicit reasonable woman standard. The first and most obvi-
ous possible problem with the explicit reasonable woman standard
is that it may not meet the needs of everyone who seek recourse
from sexual harassment under Title VII. As Justice Stevens dis-
sented in Ellison, since Title VII was "designed to achieve a bal-
anced and generally gender neutral and harmonious workplace" it
must come to the aid of all potential victims of sexual harassment
in the workplace. 70 The fact that women may be the most frequent
targets of sexual harassment, Justice Stevens stated, did not neces-
sarily mean that they were the only targets.71 Justice Stevens,
therefore, advocated a gender neutral standard such as the reason-
able "victim," "target," or "person.
'72
This writer contends, however, that adopting the explicit reason-
able woman standard does not preclude the courts from using the
appropriate victim's perspective- that of a reasonable man-
where a male employee brings an action alleging that his co-work-
ers or supervisors have engaged in conduct which created a hostile
working environment. Nevertheless, the adoption of the explicit
reasonable woman standard is appropriate given the statistical re-
ality of sexual harassment claims being brought predominantly, if
not almost exclusively, by women.
68. Id.
69. Id.





Another problem with the explicit or implicit reasonable woman
standard might be its applicability. For instance, asking judges and
jurors, many of whom are men, to apply a reasonable woman stan-
dard might be unfeasible because it would theoretically require a
man to see with and/or through the eyes of a woman. Although the
male judge or juror and the female victim would perceive the same
conduct or occurrences, the man's experiences may prevent him
from properly "seeing" the events and circumstances from the wo-
man's perception, viewpoint, or experience. This problem can be
best exemplified and understood given the finding testified to by
an expert in the field of psychology in the Robinson decision.
7 3
This finding revealed almost "flip-flop attitudes" when both men
and women were asked what their response would be to being sex-
ually approached in the workplace.7 " Approximately two-thirds of
the men said that they would be flattered and only fifteen percent
said they would feel insulted -5 For the women, the proportions
were reversed. 6
Admittedly, if examined theoretically, the applicability of a rea-
sonable woman standard is questionable. Because of differences of
opinion between men and women as to what constitutes hostile en-
vironment sexual harassment, a male judge or juror may not be
able to accurately assess the perspective of the reasonable woman.
From the more important practical standpoint, however, this au-
thor believes that applying the reasonable woman standard would
necessarily be preferable to using a result under a male-biased
"gender neutral" standard. Applying the reasonable woman stan-
dard, at the least, forces a male judge or juror to examine or ad-
dress the hypothetical reasonable woman's perspective, view, or ex-
perience. Consideration of the female-plaintiff's perspective, as
already stated, is an essential aspect to effectively adjudicating
sexual harassment claims. Therefore, any attempt by a male of as-
sessing the perspective of a reasonable woman under the reasona-
ble woman standard would necessarily lead to a better result than
using a gender neutral standard which ignores the experiences and
perspectives of women.
Finally, another potential problem with the employment of the
explicit or implicit reasonable woman standard is that it may per-
mit a cause of action to arise out of a well-intentioned compliment.
73. See notes 60-69 and the accompanying text for a discussion of Robinson.





It could be argued that because a reasonable woman standard ex-
amines primarily the female-victim's perspective, a well-inten-
tioned compliment on the part of a male employee may be inter-
preted by the female employee as a sexual remark or advance and,
therefore, form the basis of a cause of action for sexual
harassment.
Undoubtedly, under the explicit or implicit reasonable woman
standard, there may be an occasion where certain conduct, such as
compliments, can be classified as unlawful sexual harassment even
though the harasser did not intend or realize that his conduct was
creating a hostile environment. This author believes, however, that
such a scenario is highly unlikely. Mere traditional compliments
would have to be very "pervasive" in order to create a hostile
working environment., Furthermore, if a "traditional compliment"
were that pervasive, it might be questionable whether or not the
compliment was ever really well-intentioned.
VI. CONCLUSION
Considering the inability of the courts to effectively adjudicate
sexual harassment claims, the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals to espouse the explicit reasonable woman standard, as
well as other courts' decisions to adopt implicit reasonable woman
standards, should assist women in their quest for equality and ac-
ceptance in the workplace. The reasonable woman standard is only
an attempt by these courts to address the fundamental problem of
adjudicating a sexual harassment claim. The rudimentary problem,
as stated before, is that men regard sexual conduct in the work-
place differently than women do. The "gender neutral" reasonable
person standard tends to be male-biased and the perspective of the
woman is lost. Therefore, if the reasonable woman standard only
succeeds in forcing the courts and litigants to address the perspec-
tive and/or experience of the female-victim, the standard should be
a success and an achievement in the women's struggle for equality
in the workplace. Furthermore, given this possibility, reason for its
adoption and continued application far outweigh any arguments
for its elimination.
Nevertheless, as with any relatively innovative standard, the via-
bility of the reasonable woman standard will be tested. In the long
run, to be successful the reasonable woman standard will have to
be adaptable to the changes in the views of the reasonable woman.
Hopefully, with the assistance of education and strongly enforced
anti-harassment employment policies, the reasonable woman stan-
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dard will help bridge the gap in perception, between men and
women, so that one day both will know what conduct offends the
reasonable person of -the opposite sex. For now, if the reasonable
woman standard at least draws the males' attention to the perspec-
tives of a woman who must endure workplace harassment, the
standard will be a small but progressive step in the women's strug-
gle to rid the workplace of sexual harassment and stabilize them-
selves in the workplace on equal-footing.
Jeffrey A. Gettle
